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evidence showed no attempt to monopolize in fact, the possibility of it
was sufficient to sustain a statute requiring ownership of theaters to be
separated from the production of the films."' But this has been the
limit of judicial tolerance; where the possibility of a monopoly was
wholly lacking, a statute prohibiting a public utility from selling gas
and electrical appliances has been held unconstitutional.8" The Ohio
provision thus necessarily falls without the area of judicial approbation,
for its very purpose is to restrict rather than to enlarge the group engaged
in selling motor cars. So long as courts continue to nurture the monopoly
complex and to determine constitutionality in terms of the perspective
it affords, so long will limitation formulae of the Ohio type, like those
most recently proposed on analogy to utility control, remain in the
shadow of the judges' guillotine.
HENRY M. THULLEN
CORPORATIONS
CORPORATIONS - AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES - ABOLISHING
ACCRUED DIVIDENDS -A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
In the unanimous opinion of the board of directors of the National
Refining Company, payment in cash of the accrued dividends on its
preferred stock would seriously impair the company's working capital.
The board, therefore, submitted to its stockholders for approval an
amendment providing for the issuance of a prior preferred stock with
an option in the present preferred stockholders to exchange each share
of their stock for one and one-third shares of the new prior preferred
stock and three-fourths of a share of common stock. The amendment
was approved by more than the required two-thirds vote of each class of
the outstanding stock.
An action was brought by the dissenting minority holders of the
preferred stock to enjoin the board of directors from putting into opera-
tion this amendment. The Court refused to grant the injunction. John-
son v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N.E. (2d) 127 (1938).
By this decision the Supreme Court of Ohio has not only adopted
the progressive view but has forged ahead on the trail that other states
have solicitously tried to clear since the famous case of Trustees of Dart-
" Paramount Pictures Inv. v. Langer, Z3 F. Supp. Sgo (1938).
'6 Capital Gas & Electric Co. v. Boynton, 137 Kan. 717, z2 Pac. (7d) 958 (x933).
Petition for certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States but later
dismissed because of a procedural defect. Boynton v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 29z U.S. 6ox,
78 L. Ed. 1464 (x934).
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mouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L.,Ed. 629 (1819),
wherein it was decided that a charter was a contract between the
corporation and the state that could not be impaired by legislative action
in violation of Article I Section iO of the Constitution of the United
States which provides that "No State shall . . . pass any . . . law
impairing the obligation of contracts. .... "
An escape from the patent rigidity of this decision was suggested by
Mr. Justice Story who, in his concurring opinion, suggested that a state
insert in every charter it granted a provision whereby it reserved the
power to alter, amend, or repeal such charter or any provisions thereof,
at will. Today there is no state which does not reserve to itself such
power either by constitution or general statutory law.
In Article XIII Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, Ohio has
reserved to the General Assembly the power to alter or repeal the laws
under which a corporation may be formed. This reserved power has
been delegated to the corporation by sections 8623-14 and 8623-15 of
the Ohio General Code.
Two lines of irreconcilable authority have developed concerning the
power of a corporation to amend its articles solely by virtue of the reser-
vation of such power to the state.
The strict view espoused by New Jersey in Zabriskie v. Hackensack
& N.Y.R. Co., I8 N.J. Eq. 178, 9o Am. Dec. 617 (1867), is to the
effect that such reservation could not give a majority of the stockholders
a power to alter or amend which had been reserved to the state; that
"it was a reservation to the State, for the benefit of the public, to be
exercised by the State only." This view is followed in a few states
including Utah. Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac.
369 (1807); but see Salt Lake Automobile Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co.,
45 Utah 218, I43 Pac. 1015 (1914). The basis of the decisions taking
this view is the theory that the contract relations existing between the
shareholders inter sese do not come within the contemplated scope of the
power reserved to the state.
The broad view, which is founded on the postulate that a stock-
holder is bound by the rule of the majority when the corporate charter
contains a stipulation that it is subject to amendment and alteration, is
the view accepted by most courts. 7 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
COlPORATIONS, perm. ed., sections 3695-3697. Such power is broad
enough to give the corporation the right to alter the contract existing
between it and the stockholders. It constitutes nothing more than the
ordinary case of a stipulation that one of the parties to a contract may
vary its terms with the consent of the other contracting party. Durfee v.
Old Colony R. Co., 5 Allen (87 Mass.) 230 (1862).
NOTES AND COMMENTS 391
In Ohio the lower courts adopted the strict view. It was held in
Gerber v. .dmerican Seeding Co., 28 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 20 (1930),
that the power to alter and amend, reserved to the General Assembly,
did not apply to contractual rights existing between corporations and
their stockholders. This ruling was supported by a reference to County
of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific R. Co., i8 Fed. 385 (1883), which
in turn was based flatly on the New Jersey view.
Fortunately, the Court of Appeals in Williams v. National Pwmp
Co., 46 Ohio App. 427, 188 N.E. 756 (933), reversed the lower
court which had followed the Gerber case, supra. It held that the res-
ervation to the state, by the constitution, and to the corporation by Ohio
G.C. secs. 8623-14 and 8623-15, is an integral part of the stockholders
contract and may be exercised by the corporation. By adopting the broad
view the court placed Ohio in line with the majority and preserved for
Ohio corporations a greater facility to meet economic demands of the
day through desired changes in the capital structure. When a corpora-
tion is checked in its efforts to regiment its finances, by antiquated con-
cepts, premature senility is forced upon it, and continued existence is
often a lingering death.
In Johnson v. Lamprecht the articles of incorporation of the Na-
tional Refining Co., contained the following provisions pertinent to the
preferred stock:
"(2) The corporation shall not be at liberty, without consent in
writing first obtained of the holders of Y in amount of the
preferred stock issued and outstanding--
"(a) To create or issue any other or further shares ranking
in any respect tar passu with or in priority to the
aforesaid issue of preference shares.
"(3) The said preference shares shall carry and be entitled to a
fixed cumulative preferential dividend not to exceed 8% per
annum on the par value thereof.
"If in any year dividends amounting to eight per centum (8%)
per annum shall not be paid on such preferred stock, the
deficiency shall be a charge on the net profits and be payable,
but without any interest before any dividends shall be paid or
set apart for the common stock."
Admitting that a corporation has the power to amend its articles and
so affect the contract of the existing stockholders (Curran, Minority
Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters, 32 Mich. L.
Rev. 743; 1934) the issue remains: may a corporation so amend its
articles as to divest the minority holders of the preferred stock of their
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accrued, but undeclared, dividends? Stated in another way the problem
is, how far may the corporation go in altering the contract existing
between it and the stockholders?
It was the admitted purpose of the amendment in Johnson v. Lam-
precht to eliminate payment of the accumulated and unpaid dividends on
the preferred stock. In effect, though not in theory, the decision does
eliminate such accumulated and unpaid dividends, for even though the
holders under the amendment have the option of retaining their stock or
of exchanging it for the proposed new issue, the stock which they hold
is now second preferred and by contract their only right to preferential
payment is to be paid before any payments are made to the common
stockholders.
One of the leading cases on the problem involved here is Morris v.
Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Ad. 696 (1923). After an
extensive review of virtually all the authority the court concluded that
in the issuance of new classes of prior preferred stock only a preference
was involved, and this was clearly permitted by the Delaware Corpora-
tion Law. But the court refused to carry the broad view to the extent
of its possible ramifications by refusing to allow an amendment to the
articles which attempted to destroy the right of an objecting holder of
preferred stock to accrued and unpaid dividends thereon.
Although the framers of the Delaware Corporation Law, as it existed
at the time of the Morris case, had drafted it broadly enough to meet
just such a situation as was presented in the Morris case, the court did
not see it that way. In 1927, section 26 of the Delaware Corporation
Law was amended to read that a Delaware corporation " . . . may,
from time to time, when and as desired, amend its Certificate of In-
corporation . . . by increasing or decreasing its authorized capital stock
or reclassifying the same by changing the number, par value, designa-
tions, preferences, or relative participation, optional or other special
rights of the shares. . . . " Del. Rev. Code (935). The majority
of the court in Hlarr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 Fed. (2d) 332
(933), was convinced that the law as amended was broad enough to
justify the abolition of the rights of the holders of the present preferred
stock to receive accrued dividends before any dividends were paid on
any other stock. Judge Learned Hand dissented. He felt that the deci-
sion in the Morris case was controlling in spite of the amendment.
It was not long thereafter, however, that the case of Keller v. T'vil-
son, 19o Ad. 115 (Del. Ch., 1936), raised the same general problem
in the Delaware Court. Again, in the face of the amended law the
court followed the decision of the Morris case. It intimated that since
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the corporation was formed prior to the amendment of 1927 the amend-
ment could not have any effect on the contractual rights created at the
time of incorporation. Apparently, the loophole which the court left
for subsequent decisions was not substantial for when it had before it
another case with the same problem it again followed the Morris case
even though the corporation was created after the 1927 amendment.
Johnson v. Consolidated Film Industries, 194 Ad. 844 (Del. Ch.,
1937). It is submitted that under this broad statute the decision should
have gone the other way.
If an amendment to the articles is such as to divest the holders of
the preferred stock of a vested right it is invalid. Morris v. Public Util-
ities Co., supra; Keller v. TFilson, supra; Johnson v. Consolidated Film
Industries, supra; Louis Pronick v. Spirits Distributing Corp., 58 N.J.
Eq. 97, 42 Adt. 586 (1899) ; Gen'l Investment Co. v. American Hide
and Leather Co., 97 N.J. Eq. 214, 127 At. 529 (1925), .lff'd. 98
N.J. Eq. 326, 129 Ad. 244 (1925). The consideration in the liberal
decisions is no longer based on the "contract clause" of the Constitution
of the United States but on the 14th amendment thereto, "No State
shall . . . deprive any person of . . . property, without due process of
law. . . . "
All courts will permit the alteration of mere preferences as dis-
tinguished from vested rights. Morris v. Public Utilities Co., supra;
Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 Ad. 654
(1928); Pennington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction Corp.,
17 Del. Ch. 394, I55 At. 514 (193i); Hinckley v. Schwarzschild &
Sulzberger Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 95 N.Y.S. 357 (1905);
Breslav v. N. 1'. & Queens Electric Light & Power Co., 249 App.
Div. i8i, 291 N.Y.S. 932 (936), dff'd w/o op. 273 N.Y. 593,
7 N.E. (2d) 708 (1937); In re Kinney et al., i8 N.E. (2d) 645
(New York, 1939). What constitutes a vested right is the mooted
question the answer to which is dependent upon the statutes of the state
and the attitude of the court construing them.
Those courts which seek to delimit the class of vested rights have
gone so far as to say, but not to hold, that the reserved power of the
state gives the state the unqualified right to alter or amend the articles
or confer upon the stockholders the right to do so, irrespective of the
nature and character of the change involved. In short, all rights of the
stockholder are made subservient to corporate needs. Hinckley v.
Schwarzschild & Sulzberger Co., supra. A similar attitude was ex-
pressed in Delaware. Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., supra.
Subsequent decisions in both states failed to carry out the expressions.
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Breslav v. N. Y. & Queens Electric Light & Power Co., supra; Keller
v. Wilson, supra.
To the writers of THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (Berle and Means) such a policy is apparently not socially
desirable. They seem to be unduly solicitous of the possible harm and
injustice that will inure to the rights of the minority stockholders. With
all due respect to the opinion of the authors, it is submitted that the
possible injury to the minority stockholders will be more than compen-
sated by the increased benefits to the corporation, its creditors, and those
dependent upon it. For the benefit of the corporation a dissenting minor-
ity of the stockholders should not have the power to enjoin a necessary
and desirable amendment.
The Ohio General Corporation Act which was adopted in 1927 was
based on the contractual theory with regard to the rights and relation-
ship of the stockholder to the corporation. Dodd, Amendment of Cor-
porate .4rticles under the New Ohio General Corporation Afet (1930)
4 Univ. of Cincinnati L. Rev. 129. The spirit to be drawn from its
broad provisions is not unlike that of the Delaware Corporation Law.
It was the intention of the framers to give great latitude to the corpora-
tions in altering the capital structure to meet economic demands. John-
son v. Lamprecht, supra, was properly decided in accord with the desired
effect of the Ohio act.
With the decision of the principal case at hand, counsel and corpo-
rate directors may well speculate as to the extent of the changes con-
templated as being within the scope of the decision. The action of a
majority of the stockholders in changing preferred stock into common
stock was upheld in Ohio. Williams v. National Pump Corp., supra.
Conversely, paragraph (f) of section 14 of the Ohio Corporation Act
would seem to be broad enough to permit the change of common stock
into preferred stock. With a statute quite as broad, New Jersey, follow-
ing its commitment to the strict view, refused to sanction a change of
common stock into preferred. Grausman v. Porto-Rican American
Tobacco Co., 95 N.J. Eq. 155, 121 Ad. 895 (1923), Aff'd 95 N.J.
Eq. 223, 122 Ad. 815 (1923).
In the course of the opinion in the principal case, the court held that
the minority dissenting preferred stockholders were at liberty to retain
their present preferred stock on the same terms and conditions as they
now held it, thus emphasizing the fact that no rights were invaded.
Later, in discussing the right of dissenting shareholders to ask for an
appraisal of their stock under section 72 of the Ohio General Corpora-
tion Act, the court held that the stockholders have a right to ask for
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appraisal if the purpose of the amendment is to change the express terms
and provisions of any of the outstanding shares having preference in
dividend, redemption price, or liquidation price over any other class of
shares and implied that the express terms had been varied so as to war-
rant appraisal under said section.
It is submitted that the court was inconsistent in holding that the
stockholders might both retain the stock upon the same terms or consider
the express terms varied by the amendment so as to justify an appraisal.
Having cautiously maneuvered the amendment through the labyrinth of
the provisions pertinent to the preferred stock as heretofore set out, the
court left little doubt as to the fact that no vested interest, preferences, or
other rights of the dissenting prefered stockholders had been violated.
Thus it would seem that ipso facto no express terms could have been
varied. It is submitted that section 72 should not have been held
applicable. Perhaps the court was straining the point in order to avert
the possibility of future litigation in deference to Professor Dodd, supra,
who suggested that a literal construction of "express terms" as defined
in section 4 of the Ohio General Corporation Act would narrow the
rights of appraisal and result in much litigation. See Senate Bill 47
section 8623 (8) which reads: "The term 'express terms and provi-
sions' with reference to a class of shares means only the statements
expressed in the articles with respect thereto."
In conclusion it is significant to note that the Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion Committee on Corporation Law in its December 26, 1938 report
on proposed amendments to the General Corporation Act deemed it
necessary to include provisions specifically providing for the power to
eliminate accrued, undeclared, cumulative dividends and also for the
right of appraisal of shares where the accrued dividends on preferred
shares are eliminated by such amendment to the articles. (See Senate
Bill No. 47, 9 3rd General Assembly, Regular Session, 1939-1940).
ARTHUR E. ORLEAN
CRIMINAL LAW
CRIMINAL LAW - SPRING GUN, LIABILITY FOR USE OF
To prevent repetition of a destructive forage on his melon patch,
defendant concealed two spring guns on his land, one at each end of
the patch. One Wagoner, attempting to repeat a prior sortie, touched a
wire and received numerous body wounds. An indictment under Sec-
tion 12420 of the Ohio General Code, shooting with intent to wound,
